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1, Introduction
There is a resurgence o f interest in a d o lla riz a tio n regim e in w h ich one country, C, uses money produced by another country, M 1. In th is d o lla riz a tio n regim e, M uses in fla tio n to raise seigniorage fro m C. The seigniorage takes the fo rm o f a balance o f payment d e fic it th a t M runs w ith C2.
However, such seignorage is produced at the cost o f an e xte rn a lity -the w elfare loss imposed by in fla tio n on C th a t M does not take in to account. Assume M has no fis c a l constraint so th a t any seigniorage fro m M ' s households is returned to them by the a uthorities. Then, M equates the m arginal seigniorage fro m C ' s households to the m arginal cost to households in M caused by the loss o f the services o f real balances due to in fla tio n , The re sulting " o p tim al" in fla tio n m axim izes the w elfare o f M ' s households b u t ignores the d is u tility caused by in fla tio n to C' s households. Our analysis makes use o f a general form ula to determ ine th is " op tim a l" in fla tio n , w h ich allow s us to feed in a lte rn a tive demand functions fo r money and takes in to account the re la tive income size o f M to C. We then tu rn to the analysis o f a grow th o f incom e in M and / o r C and its e ffect on M ' s " optim al" in fla tio n . We also provide some em p irica l estimates o f the " op tim al" in fla tio n rate and the seigniorage M receives fro m C at th is fa te o f in fla tio n . Can the 1 See A n tin o lfi and K e iste r (2001) and Change (2000) fo r a review o f the lite ra tu re. 2 A va ria nt o f th is analysis occurs when no t o n ly M can raise seigniorage from C but various regions in C compete fo r seigniorage fro m a weak central bank in C. The re su ltin g Nash e q u ilib riu m leads to an undesirably high rate o f in fla tio n since each region ignores the external e ffects produced by in fla tio n on com peting regions. For example, see the interesting papers by Aizenm an (1992) and Cooper and K e m p f (2001) .
provisions o f a contract between M and € in w h ich any p o te n tia l seignorage accruing to M is shared w ith C induce M n o t to take any seigniorage fro m C? We derive a sharing parameter o f such a contract.
F in a lly , we provide estimates o f the present discounted values o f the cost to C ' s households o f the seigniorage accruing fro m C to M . However, d o lla riza tio n by C may w e ll re sult in the gain to C' s households o f lo w e r in fla tio n . Estimates o f the present discounted value o f the net gain to C ' s households are provided. In itia lly , assume th a t ou tp u t per household and the number o f households are unchanged over tim e (th is assumption is la te r relaxed). The money-income ra tio is f(p ) in M and g (p ) in C, where p is the anticipated rate o f in fla tio n . f(p ) and g (p ) are fun ctio ns o f p alone since the incom e e la s tic ity o f demand fo r money is assumed u n ity (the analysis is a steady State one). A household' s real money demand fu n ctio n is mm = f(p )y m in M and me = g (p )y c in C4. Aggregating over households,
3 In th is assumption, o u r analysis d iffe rs fro m that o f Cooper and K e m p f (2001). Cooper and K e m p f use an overlapping generations model in w h ich higher in fla tio n reduces ou tp u t d ire c tly . This requires, as they note, that substitution e ffect dom inate income e ffe c t on the labor supply. 4 These money demand fu nctions can be derived from a general e q u ilib riu m model using e x p lic it u tility functions. 
w h ich is the area under M ' s real money demand fu n ctio n between the quantities held at a p o in t o f no money g ro w th and at an in fla tio n rate 7t (7c is an a ctually p re va ilin g value o f p ). We assume M has no fis c a l constraint so that any seigniorage fro m M ' s households is returned to them. Since there is no grow th, the grow th rate o f money or is equal to it. The seigniorage M receives fro m C is
The excess o f the seigniorage fro m C over M ' s w elfare cost is M ' s net gain fro m in fla tin g at k :
M sets the in fla tio n rate to m axim ize th is net gain to M ' s households. The fir s torder co n d itio n fo r th is m a xim ization is M c * (l -r lc* ) = M m* r im* 6
where flm* = -7 t * f ( i t * ) / f(7 t* ) 5 Equation (3 ) is the net consumers' surplus after seigniorage is returned to households. Lucas (2000) shows a measure o f the consumers' surplus is a good approxim ation to the w e lfa re cost o f in fla tio n measured by the compensating va ria tio n w h ich is derived fro m e x p lic it u t ilit y m axim ization. 6 This is a generalization o f the fo rm u la fo r the ra tio o f the m arginal w e lfa re Ipss to the m arginal revenue in a single economy when the m axim ization is taken w ith respect to the money rate o f interest: dW / dS = r jj / (1 -q fl, where q i is the e la s tic ity o f demand o f real balance w ith respect to th e money rate o f interest. See M a rty (1976) . Here, the rate o f p rice change is taken as an approxim ation. r |c* = -Jt*g ' (n ;*) / g(it*)7 rjm * and r |c* are the e la s tic ity o f the real money demand w ith respect to th e common in fla tio n rate under d o lla riza tio n . Mm*, M e*, rim* and r jc* are a ll evaluated at n*, w h ich is " o p tim a l" fro m the lim ite d p o in t o f vie w o f M ' s households. A t th is " o p tim a l" rate, o u r fo rm u la (6 ) equates the m arginal seigniorage fro m C to the m arginal w e lfa re loss to M .
The fo rm u la can be used to feed in alternative demand fu n ctio n s (th is is done la te r) and to determ ine how M ' s " o ptim al" in fla tio n varies w ith alternative o utput levels.
T o see how 7t* varies w ith output levels, le t R = Yc / Ym and h(7t*, R ) -R g (jc * )(l -Tfe*) -fJ(7C*)r|m. 0h(7t*, R ) / e k * < 0 fro m the second-order con d itio n and dh(7t*, R ) / <3R = g (jc *)( 1 -t | c* ) > 0 given th a t f(7 t*), g(7t*) and T}m* are a ll p o s itiv e 8. Then,
T h is re sult makes in tu itiv e sense. The larger is C re la tive to M , the higher is M ' s " o p tim a l" in fla tio n M oreover, in the absence o f grow th, d o lla riz a tio n always induces M to in fla te ( tc* = 0 o n ly i f R = 0).
A t J i*, M receives Sc* = 7t*Mc* = 7t* Y cg (7 t*) from C. Take the ra tio o f S0* to Yc and d iffe re n tia te th is ra tio w ith respect to R (7t* is an increasing fu n ctio n o f R ). Then,
T his shows the la rg er is R, the greater proportion o f C ' s incom e is appropriated by M as seigniorage.
7 N ote th a t the e la sticitie s are independent o f aggregate output. 8 I f f(7 t*), g(7t*) and r jm* are a ll p o sitive , r |c* is less than u n ity fro m (6 ). T h is may be seen as fo llo w s . I f no w elfare loss is imposed by in fla tio n on M ' s households, M w ill set w ill 71* where the seigniorage is m axim ized at t j c = 1. The fa ct th a t in fla tio n produces a loss to M ' s households im p lie s that is less than 1. 9 The firs t-o rd e r co n d itio n im p lie s g (7 t*) + 7t*g' (7 t*) = g (7 t* )(l -rfc *) > 0.
N ow , we apply the form ula (6 ) to alternative demand functions. Suppose that f(p ) and g (p ) are lin e a r in both countries:
f(p ) = a -a p a > 0 and a > 0
g (p ) = b -pp b > 0 and p > 0
From (6 ),
A lte rn a tiv e ly , suppose th a t f(p ) and g (p ) are both sem i-log:
71* satisfies the fo llo w in g con d itio n :
A ctosed-form so lu tio n is not generally possible. However, suppose th a t the semi e la s tic itie s are equal (a = P). Then, a closed-form so lu tio n is obtained:
I f we fu rth e r assume th a t M and C have the same sem i-log fu n ctio n ( a = P and a -b), then (1 5 ) reduces to M ' s net gain is
Gm,t -S et -Wrn,t
= {a tYe,og(7tt) -[fV-?Ym,of(p)dp -CtY.eofrTiOlKl + X ?
(2 2) im p lie s th a t rct and o t are constant i f M m axim izes (22). Since the money-income V ra tio is constant fo r a given rate o f in fla tio n , the fo llo w in g relationship holds at each p o in t o f tim e:
U sing (2 3 ), re w rite (22):
G^t -S e t -W ra>t = { ( 5 1 + X ) Y e o g ( J t )
-[JV -^Y m,of(p)dp -(7t + X)Ym,of (5c)
M a x im iz in g (2 2 )' w ith respect to k yie ld s 
7t* satisfies th is condition.
10 In a ll cases, the lo w e r lim it o f in te g ra tio n is taken at a p o in t where money grow th is zero. In the no grow th case, th is is zero in fla tio n ; in the g row th case, it is at a rate o f d e fla tio n equal to output grow th.
I f M and C grow s, 7t* is a fu n c tio n o f X. H ow does grow th in flue nce " o p tim a l" in fla tio n ? (2 4 ) im p lie s a 7 tV a x = -[5 h ( 7 E * ,X .) /S X ]/[a i( 7 r * ,X ) /a « * ]< 0 11 ( 2 5 ) That is, the higher is aggregate o u tput g ro w th (both gro w th rates are equal), the lo w e r is the " o p tim a l" in fla tio n rate. N ote ou tpu t g ro w th has a le ve l e ffe ct on n*; it* is constant since the re la tiv e incom e size o f C to M remains constant over tim e.
A s in the no g row th case, we apply (2 4 ) to the lin e a r and sem i-log functions. I f f(p ) and g (p ) are both lin e a r, fro m (2 4),
I f Y«,o is s u ffic ie n tly sm all re la tiv e to Ym,o, (2 6 ) is approxim ated by
A lte rn a tiv e ly , fo r the sem i-log fun ction s, 7t* satisfies
oaExp[-aa;*]a7t* + A m E xp[-ax*]Y m,o (27)
Assum ing th a t a = p,
I f we fu rth e r assume th a t M and C have the same sem i-log fu n ctio n ( a = p and a = b),
We la te r use th is expression fo r e m pirica l estimates.
11 To prove th is , le t h(7t*,
. <3h(7t*, X) / dit* < 0 fro m the second-order co nd ition and 5 h (tt* , X) / dX ~ (S M^o* / dit*) + (<3MCj o* / Bit*) < 0. T o ta lly d iffe re n tia tin g h(7t*, X) yie lds (24).
Com paring the g row th cases (2 6 )' and (2 8 ) w ith the no grow th cases (1 1) and
( 1 5 ), we see th a t in fla tio n is lo w e r than in the no grow th case by the g ro w th rate o f output. Note, however, the larger is X, the greater p ro p o rtio n o f C ' s incom e is appropriated b y M as seigniorage. F o r the lin e a r functions,
S im ila rly , fo r the sem i-log functions,
Since dn* /dX<0, d(Sc/ / Y Cj t) / 3X > 0 fo r both functions. T his result th a t the prop o rtio n o f C ' s incom e accruing to M as seigniorage increases despite a fa ll in in fla tio n may appear c o u n te rin tu itiv e . We provide a geom etric explanation fo r th is result, using 
A t th is p o in t, no seigniorage accrues to M fro m C. The e la s tic ity o f demand fo r money w ith respect to the in fla tio n rate is zero.
On the other hand, suppose th a t C grow s faster than M . A ny w elfare cost to M ' s households becomes increasingly in s ig n ific a n t as compared to the seigniorage fro m C. In the lim it, M sim p ly m axim izes the seigniorage fro m C by se ttin g C' s e la s tic ity o f money demand at u n ity . F o r the lin e a r fu n ctio n, limt^ooTtt* -b / 2P -A c /2 (3 2) S im ila rly , fo r the sem i-log fu n ctio n lim t-W C t* = 1/|3 -Xc (3 2 )'
(3 2 ) and (3 2 )' show in fla tio n is reduced by C ' s grow th. I t may be o f interest to analyze a special case in w h ich g ro w th occurs o n ly in C and in w h ich M issues money in a w ay th a t insulates M ' s households fro m the e ffects o f in fla tio n 12. Then, M sets k to m axim ize the seigniorage fro m C:
Sc,t = a tMc,t = (ftt + Xt)Vc,og(7tt)( 1 + K f (33)
The firs t-o rd e r co n d itio n is
Mc,t* ( l -Tic*) + Xc(dMc,t* / arc**) -0 (3 4) N ote th a t ot and 7tt are constant over tim e.
I f g (p )
is lin e a r, fro m (3 4)
This so lu tio n is id e n tica l to the asym ptotic case (32). " o p tim a l" in fla tio n is constant and low ered by C ' s g ro w th .
T his is also id e n tica l to (3 2 )'.
19 This case was o rig in a lly analyzed by M u n d e ll (1973), using lin e a r demand functions.
He assumes th a t the grow th o f money in M is issued as a pro-rata-share o f o rig in a l money holdings o f M ' s households (so-called W eldon money) so th a t cash balances e ffe c tiv e ly pay an interest rate equal to the rate o f in fla tio n . He distinguishes between incom ew idening g row th due to an increase in the number o f households and the grow th o f incom e per household. In the la tte r case, his analysis purports to show th a t the rate o f in fla tio n increases w ith o u t lim it. A s our analysis shows, h is conclusions are erroneous since the rate o f in fla tio n is low ered by the grow th rate o f output and tim e -in va ria n t w hether due to an increase in the number o f households o r income per household. N ote th a t " o p tim al" in fla tio n is ve ry lo w i f C is sm all re la tive to M . Take Ecuador and E l Salvador, w h ich cu rre n tly d o lla riz e w ith the U n ited States. 200l ' s re la tiv e share is 0.0018 fo r Ecuador and 0.0014 fo r E l Salvador13. F or a la rg er country, Argentina, its re la tiv e share is 0.0257. Assuming the common values o f the sem i-e la sticity (5 , 7 and 9 fo r a = p ) and o f the grow th rate (0.02 fo r X), Table 1 shows that estimated te* ' s are generally sm all. F o r Argentina, the estimates range fro m -1 .8 % to -1 .5 % . They are n e g lig ib ly sm all fo r Ecuador and E l Salvador.
Empirical Estimates
I t may be amusing to analyze the case in w h ich the U nited K ingdom " dollarizes" w ith the European M onetary U n io n (E M U ). A ltho ug h u n lik e ly , suppose th at the European Central B ank (E C B ) sets the in fla tio n rate to m axim ize the w elfare o f the current member countries at a cost o f U K households. Table 2 shows the " op tim al" in fla tio n rate th a t w ould be set by the ECB, given that the re la tive share o f U K GDP is Tables 1 and 2 ). F or A rgentina, Ecuador and E l Salvador, the estimates are a ll n e g lig ib ly sm all and below 0.2% . F or the U n ited K ingdom , the estimates are somewhat larger although they do not exceed 1.3%.
14 We fo llo w Lucas (2000) fo r the param etric values o f the sem i-log function.
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A Sharing Arrangement
I t has been proposed th a t M share po te ntial seignorage w ith C to induce M not to take any seigniorage fro m C 15. In th is section, we analyze such a sharing arrangement.
In itia lly , we assume the absence o f grow th.
Under th is contract, M p o te n tia lly is com pelled to pay back a fra c tio n o f to ta l seigniorage. T o ta l seigniorage is the sum o f seigniorage fro m the households in M and C:
M receives Sc fro m C and pays back <j >S to C, where <j > denotes the sharing fra ctio n . Then, M ' s net receipt o f the seignorage is Sc -<j)S, w hich is also M ' s balance o f payment d e fic it.
M ' s net gain is
G iven <j >, M m axim izes (3 8) w ith respect to n. Then,
(1 -<j>)Mc*(l -rjc *) -^* ( 1 -rim *) = M m *r|m* (3 9) (3 9 ) shows that the " o ptim al" rate o f in fla tio n is now a fu n ctio n o f <j > and im p lie s
15 Senator Connie M ack introduced such proposals, the In ternational M onetary S ta b ility A c t (S. 1879) and its revised version (S. 2101), in the US senate. That is, it* is a decreasing fu n ctio n o f <| > under the sharing arrangement.
T o make in fla tio n zero, <j>** o f the to ta l potential seigniorage must be paid back to C: M m* * , M e **, rim ** and tic* * are a ll evaluated at zero in fla tio n . F or M m **and M e ** to exist, real money demands must be satiated at fin ite quantities so tha t r jm* * = tic* * = O17
Then, (4 1 ) becomes <!)** « M e ** / (M m ** + M e **) (4 2 ) T h is ra tio determines the sharing parameter <j)** tha t is p o te n tia lly paid back to C to induce M not to in fla te . O f course, no seignorage accrues to M at zero in fla tio n .
I f we assume that M and C have the same money demand fu n c tio n (o r e q u iva le n tly, f(p ) = g (p )), then (4 2) reduces to
<)>** = Y c /(Y m + Y c) (42)'
In th is case, <(>** is determined by the re la tiv e share o f C' s aggregate output18.
We now extend th is analysis o f the sharing arrangement to the case where M and C g ro w at the same rate X. A t tim e t, M ' s net gain is 16 L e t h(7t*, <j >) =(1 -<j>)Mc*(l -Tic*) -(j)M m *(l -T|m*) -M m *t|m *. Sll(7T*, <|>) / &K* < 0 from the second-order con d itio n and d h(7t*, <}>) / <5<J> = -M c * (l -t | c* ) -M m* ( l -r |m* ) < 0 since 0 < <j > < 1. Then, (4 0) results. 17 F o r any demand fu n ctio n th a t is satiated at a fin ite quantity, the p rice e la s tic ity o f demand is zero at a point o f satiation. L e t the price e la s tic ity o f demand as e = (SQd/dP)(P /Q d). Then, s = 0 i f Qd is non-zero at P = 0 (and <3Qd/i3P is fin ite ). 8 (4 2 )' is id e n tica l to what Cooper and K e m p f (2001) fin d in an overlapping generations m odel and we are indebted to th e ir analysis. They assume tha t representative agents are id e n tic a l in both countries, w h ich im plies th a t ffp ) = g (p). O ur analysis requires o n ly tha t <j)** is determined by M m* * and M e**.
G m , t = S c>t -4 > S t -W m , t = {(% + X)Yc,og(7r) -W t + k) + Y c,og(Jt)]
-[JV^Ym,ofl:p)dp -%Ym,of{n)]}0 + Vf M a xim izin g (4 3 ) w ith respect to re yie ld s:
In the grow th case, the sharing parameter <J>** is set so tha t M is forced to deflate at the pay back 2.5% o f to ta l p o te n tial seigniorage to A rgentina and 0.1% to Ecuador and E l Salvador19.
19 GDP is fro m World Development Indicator Online. where r > Xc (the steady state is e ffic ie n t).
A Cost-Benefit Analysis o f Dollarization
Assum ing M is the U n ited States, Table 4 Table 1 . In order to g ive these form ulas a run, we assume r = 0.03. U sing the alternative values o f th e sem i-elasticity P, the estimates fo r A rgentina range fro m 12.0% to 20.0% o f GDP. The estimates are n e g lig ib ly sm all fo r Ecuador (0.9% -1 .4 % ) and E l Salvador (0.7% -1.1% )21.
D o lla riz a tio n by C, On the other hand, may w e ll re su lt in low er in fla tio n . T his is a w e lfa re gain to C' s households. Suppose C' s government in fla te s at nc before d o lla riz a tio n . In itia lly , assume C ' s government returns any seigniorage taken fro m C' s households to them (w e la te r make a more re a lis tic assumption that C ' s governm ent does n o t re tu rn any seigniorage). The w elfare cost o f in fla tio n to C ' s households before d o lla riz a tio n is L c,t ~ J p=-xcMc,tdp -OcMc,t fo r Ecuador and fro m 273% to 297.7% fo r E l Salvador.
Conclusions
When in fla tio n is s ig n ific a n t ( i f o n ly it could la st)25.
The lim ita tio n s o f o u r analysis should be borne in m ind. Under d o lla riz a tio n , a co u n try gives up an independent monetary p o lic y -one aspect o f th is is the loss by the central bank o f the lender o f la st resort fu n c tio n M oreover, ty in g the exchange rate to the d o lla r may re su lt in an appreciated real exchange rate when a com petitor devalues (A rg e n tin a versus B ra z il). F in a lly , o u r analysis assumes in fla tio n is anticipated. This 24 I f M is the U nited States, th is assumption is reasonable. Seigniorage in the U nited States is an in s ig n ific a n t fra c tio n o f its incom e. F o r example, K in g and Plosser (1985) reports seigniorage equals 0.3% o f GNP in the 1952-1982 period. 25 I t was the fis c a l need fo r revenue in a country o f lo w ta x m o ra lity lik e A rgentina and co m pe titio n among provinces in A rgentina tha t led the central bank to in fla te at rates th at were on the w rong side o f the L a ffe r curve.
assum ption p u t to one side the e ffe c t o f va ria ble and less than fu lly anticipated in fla tio n w h ich , amongst other things, may lead to a confusion o f absolute and re la tive prices26. The o p tim a l rate o f in fla tio n 7t* is computed fro m (2 8 The o p tim a l rate o f in fla tio n it* is com puted from (2 8 )' under the assumption that M and C have the same sem i-log demand fu n c tio n (f(p ) = aE xp (-a p) and g (p ) = bExp(-P p), where a = b and a = (3)and g row at the same rate X = 0.02. M is the tw e lve member countries o f th e EM U . The re la tiv e share is Y c,t / (Y "j,t + Y c,t), where Y Cjt and Ym,t are C ' s and M ' s GDP in 2001. The optim al rate o f in fla tio n 7t* is computed from (2 8 The o p tim a l rate o f in fla tio n %* is computed fro m (2 8 )' under the assumption that M and C have the same sem i-log demand fu n c tio n (fi(p ) = aE xp(-ap ) and g (p ) ~ bExp ( The optim al rate o f in fla tio n it * is computed fro m (2 8 )' under the assumption th a t M and C have the same sem i-log demand fu n ctio n ( f( p ) = a E xp (-a p) and g (p ) = b E x p (-flp ), where a = b and a = P)and g row at the same rate X = 0.02. The re la tive share is Y c,t / ( Y^t + Y c>t), where Y c,t and Ym,t are C' s and M ' s incom e at tim e t.
